The Challenge of President Ahmadinejad of Iran: Can Romanticism be Reconciled with Modernism?
Newly elected Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad took office on a platform that called for both reinforcing the conservative measures supported by Iran's more fundamentalist religious leadership, some of which had been moderated of late, and seeking a path of rapid modernization and economic development. This odd combination of romanticism (religious fundamentalism) and modernism has some resonance of the rise of George W. Bush in the United States, who has found it politically expendient to embrace the romanticism of religious fundamentalism (even evoking the Crusades in his pursuit of very explicitly modernist objectives in the Middle East) and at other times, such as his call for the development of hydrogen energy sources or advancing globalization in trade agreements, embraced modernism. President Ahmadinejad could learn a good deal (both in terms of what works and what to avoid) by observing and analyzing the Bush presidency in the U.S.A.
In any event, this is an important conjuncture for Iranian society. The population of the country is predominantly below the age of 21 and yearning for a better life, in both economic terms and in terms of the freedom to express themselves (although some of the expression may be quite consistent with President Ahmadinejad, since there remains many very religious young people, some of whom worked for his election and support a more conservative moral climate). Iran is also on the verge of the development of nuclear weapons (modernity's dark force), which the West may or may not be able to short-circuit. Nuclear power would make Iran less insecure and might actually result in more moderation in the political arena, although nothing is guaranteed. It has had that effect on Pakistan and India, but Israel's government has clearly not moderated (although this may have more to do with the rise of far right elements within the Eastern European immigrant population as a key force behind Likud than it does with the technological capabilities of the Israeli military). At the end of the day, nuclear power won't solve the underlying economic problems in Iran and this is critical if the theocracy is to survive.
And Iran's leaders, especially President Ahmadinejad, recognize that the longevity of their experiment in theocracy depends critically upon the ability to foster economic development, generate higher incomes for the young workers in the society, and serve as a positive example for other Islamic societies. But there are no role models for this unique romanticist-modernist path (or, at least, I'm unable to think of any). Iran would be the example. President Ahmadinejad argued, during his campaign, that strict adherence to Islamic principles can serve as the foundation for a thriving economy and polity, but he did not lay out the path. It will be interesting to see how he proceeds. He is a young president, charismatic and certainly has strong support. In other words, he has a foundation to build upon, although the West, particularly the United States, may not give him a lot of time to get his act together. Indeed, he's been accused of having been a participant in the Iran hostage taking during the end (it was the reason for the end) of Carter's presidency. He denies this, but it is already a distraction that may cost his administration in international relations and thus make it all the more difficult for President Ahmadinejad to reach his objectives.
The new Iranian president also must figure out how to pursue modernization without threatening the 'traditional' economy, which remains large and important. This traditional economy is made up of millions of self-employed artisans and merchants, who were collectively an important interest group that opposed and helped to depose the former Shah. (see my paper, Class Analysis of the Iranian Revolution that was published in Re/presenting Class, edited by Gibson-Graham, Resnick, and Wolff, 2001, Duke University Press) He needs to find a means to get technology into the hands of the traditional sector, such that he can promote higher levels of productivity there and lower cost. At the same time, he needs to pursue both industrialization (in a manner that can match the vibrance of what is happening in China and India) and post-industrial development, recognizing the need to develop services, media, and other non-industrial areas that help to make people's lives richer.
In any event, this is an important conjuncture for Iranian society. The population of the country is predominantly below the age of 21 and yearning for a better life, in both economic terms and in terms of the freedom to express themselves (although some of the expression may be quite consistent with President Ahmadinejad, since there remains many very religious young people, some of whom worked for his election and support a more conservative moral climate). Iran is also on the verge of the development of nuclear weapons (modernity's dark force), which the West may or may not be able to short-circuit. Nuclear power would make Iran less insecure and might actually result in more moderation in the political arena, although nothing is guaranteed. It has had that effect on Pakistan and India, but Israel's government has clearly not moderated (although this may have more to do with the rise of far right elements within the Eastern European immigrant population as a key force behind Likud than it does with the technological capabilities of the Israeli military). At the end of the day, nuclear power won't solve the underlying economic problems in Iran and this is critical if the theocracy is to survive.
And Iran's leaders, especially President Ahmadinejad, recognize that the longevity of their experiment in theocracy depends critically upon the ability to foster economic development, generate higher incomes for the young workers in the society, and serve as a positive example for other Islamic societies. But there are no role models for this unique romanticist-modernist path (or, at least, I'm unable to think of any). Iran would be the example. President Ahmadinejad argued, during his campaign, that strict adherence to Islamic principles can serve as the foundation for a thriving economy and polity, but he did not lay out the path. It will be interesting to see how he proceeds. He is a young president, charismatic and certainly has strong support. In other words, he has a foundation to build upon, although the West, particularly the United States, may not give him a lot of time to get his act together. Indeed, he's been accused of having been a participant in the Iran hostage taking during the end (it was the reason for the end) of Carter's presidency. He denies this, but it is already a distraction that may cost his administration in international relations and thus make it all the more difficult for President Ahmadinejad to reach his objectives.
The new Iranian president also must figure out how to pursue modernization without threatening the 'traditional' economy, which remains large and important. This traditional economy is made up of millions of self-employed artisans and merchants, who were collectively an important interest group that opposed and helped to depose the former Shah. (see my paper, Class Analysis of the Iranian Revolution that was published in Re/presenting Class, edited by Gibson-Graham, Resnick, and Wolff, 2001, Duke University Press) He needs to find a means to get technology into the hands of the traditional sector, such that he can promote higher levels of productivity there and lower cost. At the same time, he needs to pursue both industrialization (in a manner that can match the vibrance of what is happening in China and India) and post-industrial development, recognizing the need to develop services, media, and other non-industrial areas that help to make people's lives richer.
posted by Satya | 6:47 PM
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